Abstract. In this paper, we propose a fixed point theory to solve games of imperfect information. The fixed point theory is defined on the lattice of antichains of sets of states. Contrary to the classical solution proposed by Reif [Rei84], our new solution does not involve determinization. As a consequence, it is readily applicable to classes of systems that do not admit determinization. Notable examples of such systems are timed and hybrid automata. As an application, we show that the discrete control problem for games of imperfect information defined by rectangular automata is decidable. This result extends a result by Henzinger and Kopke in [HK99] .
Introduction
Timed and hybrid systems are dynamical systems with both discrete and continuous components. A paradigmatic example of a hybrid system is a digital control program for an analog plant environment, like a furnace or an airplane: the controller state moves discretely between control modes, and in each control mode, the plant state evolves continuously according to physical laws. A natural model for hybrid systems is the hybrid automaton, which represents discrete components using finite-state machines and continuous components using real-numbered variables whose evolution is governed by differential equations or differential inclusions [ACH + 95]. The distinction between continuous evolutions of the plant state (which is given by the real-numbered variables of a hybrid automaton) and discrete switches of the controller state (which is given by the location, or control mode, of the hybrid automaton) permits a natural formulation of the safety control problem: given an unsafe set U of plant states, is there a strategy to switch the controller state in real time so that the plant can be prevented from entering U ? In other words, the hybrid automaton specifies a set of possible control modes, together with the plant behavior resulting from each mode, and the control problem asks for deriving a switching strategy between control modes that keeps the plant out of trouble.
In the literature, there are algorithms or semi-algorithms (termination is not always guaranteed) to derive such switching strategy. Those semi-algorithms usually comes in the form of symbolic fixed point computations that manipulate sets of states using a well-suited monotonic function like the controllable predecessor operator [AHK02, MPS95] . Those algorithms make a strong hypothesis: they consider that the controller that executes the switching strategy has a perfect information about the state of the controlled system. Unfortunately, this is usually an unreasonable hypothesis. Indeed, when the switching strategy has to be implemented by a real hardware, the controller typically acquires information about the state of the system by reading values on sensors. Those sensors have finite precision, and so the information about the state in which the system lies is imperfect. Let us illustrate this. Consider a controller that monitors the temperature of a tank, and has to maintain the temperature between given bounds by switching on and off a gas burner. The temperature of the tank is the state of the continuous system to control. Assume that the temperature is sensed through a thermometer that returns an integer number and ensures a deviation bounded by one degree Celsius. So, when the sensor returns the temperature c, the controller only knows that the temperature lies in the interval (c − 1, c + 1) degrees. We say that the sensor reading is an observation of the system. This observation gives an imperfect information about the state of the system. Now, if we fix a set of possible observations of the system to control, the control problem that we want to solve is the safety control problem with imperfect information: "given an unsafe set U of plant states, a set of observations, is there an observation based strategy to switch the controller state in real time so that the plant can be prevented from entering U ?". While it is well-known that safety games of perfect information can be won using memoryless strategies, it is not the case for games of imperfect information [Rei84] . In that paper, Reif studies games of incomplete information which are a subclass of safety games of imperfect information where the set of observations is a partition of the state space. Notice that this is not the case of our tank example since when the temperature of the water is d, the thermometer may return either d or d . To win such games, memory is sometimes necessary: the controller has to remember (part of) the history of observations that he has made so far. In the finite state case, games of incomplete information can be solved algorithmically. Reif proposes an algorithm that first transforms the game of incomplete information into a game of perfect information using a kind of determinization procedure.
In this paper, we propose an alternative method to solve games of imperfect (and incomplete) information. Our method comes in the form of a fixed point (semi-)algorithm that iterates a monotone operator on the lattice of antichains of sets of states. The greatest fixed point of this operator contains exactly the information needed to determine the states from which an observation based control strategy exists and to synthesize such a strategy. We prove that our algorithm has an optimal complexity for finite state games and we identify a class of infinite state games for which the greatest fixed point of the operator is computable. Using this class of games and results from [HK99] , we show that the discrete-time control problem with imperfect information is decidable for the class of rectangular automata. Strategies that win those games have some robustness properties as they can be implemented using hardware that senses its environment with finite precision.
Our fixed point method has several advantages over the algorithmic method proposed by Reif. First, as it does not require determinization, our (semi-)algorithm is readily applicable to classes of systems for which determinization is not effective: timed and hybrid automata are notable examples [AD94] . Second, we show that there are families of games on which the Reif's algorithm needs exponential time when our algorithm only needs polynomial time. Third, as our method is based on a lattice theory, abstract interpretation methods can be used to derive in a systematic way approximation algorithms [CC77] .
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we recall the definition of the lattice of antichains. In Section 3, we show how to use this lattice to solve games of imperfect information. In Section 4, we give a fixed point algorithm that is EXPTIME for finite state games and we compare with the technique of Reif. Finally, in Section 5, we solve games of imperfect information for rectangular automata. Due to lack of space, the proofs of most of the theorems have been omitted and can be found in [?] 
The Lattice of Antichains
First we recall what is the lattice of antichains. An antichain on a partially ordered set X, ≤ is a set X ⊆ X such that for any x 1 , x 2 ∈ X with x 1 = x 2 we have neither x 1 ≤ x 2 nor x 2 ≤ x 1 , that is X is a set of incomparable elements of X. We define similarly a chain to be a set of comparable elements of X.
Let q, q ∈ 2 2 S and defineif and only if ∀s ∈ q : ∃s ∈ q : s ⊆ s . This relation is a preorder but is not antisymmetric. Since we need a partial order, we construct the set L ⊆ 2 2 S for which is antisymmetric on L. The set L is the set of antichains on 2 S , ⊆ . We say that a set s ⊆ S is dominated in q if and only if ∃s ∈ q : s ⊂ s . The set of dominated elements of q is denoted Dom(q). The reduced form of q is q = q\Dom(q) and dually the expanded form of q is q = q ∪ Dom(q). The set q is an antichain of 2 S , ⊆ . Observe that Dom( q ) = ∅, that is ∀s, s ∈ q : if s 1 ⊆ s 2 then s 1 = s 2 . The relation has the useful following properties:
Lemma 2 ∀q, q ∈ 2 2 S , ∀q 1 , q 2 ∈ q, q , q , ∀q 1 , q 2 ∈ q , q , q : q 1 q 2 is equivalent to q 1 q 2 .
We can now define formally L as the set { q | q ∈ 2 2 S }.
Lemma 3
The relation ⊆ L × L is a partial ordering and L, is a partially ordered set.
Lemma 4
For q, q ∈ L, the greatest lower bound of q and q is= {s ∩ s | s ∈ q ∧ s ∈ q } and the least upper bound of q and q is= {s | s ∈ q ∨ s ∈ q } .
This lattice is the lattice of antichains.
Games of Imperfect Information

Definitions
Notations Given a finite sequence a = a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n , we denote by |a| = n + 1 the length of a, by a k = a 0 , . . . , a k the sequence of the first k + 1 elements of a (and a −1 is the empty sequence) and by last(a) = a n the last element of a.
Definition 6 [Two-player games] A two-player game is a tuple S, S 0 , Σ c , Σ u , → where S is a set of states, S 0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states, Σ c (resp. Σ u ) is a finite alphabet of controllable (resp. uncontrollable) actions, and
The game is turn-based and played by a controller against an environment. To initialize the game, the environment chooses a state x ∈ S 0 and the controller takes the first turn. A turn of the controller consists of choosing a controllable action σ that is enabled in the current state x. If no such action exists, the controllers loses. A turn of the environment then consists of determining a state y such that x σ − → y and of choosing an uncontrollable action u and a state z such that y u − → z. If no enabled action u exists the environment loses. If the game continues forever, the controller wins.
For
∈→} be the set of states in which the action σ is enabled, and for s ⊆ S let Post σ (s) = {x ∈ S | ∃x ∈ s : (x, σ, x ) ∈→} be the set of successor states of s by the action σ. Furthermore, given a set Σ ⊆ Σ c ∪ Σ u , we define the notation Post Σ (s) to mean σ∈Σ Post σ (s). The controller has an imperfect view of the game state space in that his/her choices are based on imprecise observations of the states.
Definition 7 [Observation set]
An observation set of the state space S is a couple (Obs, γ) where γ : Obs → 2 S is such that for all x ∈ S, there exists obs ∈ Obs such that x ∈ γ(obs).
An observation obs is compatible with a state x if x ∈ γ(obs). When the controller observes the current state x of the game, he/she receives one observation compatible with x. The observation is non-deterministically chosen by the environment.
Definition 8 [Imperfect information]
A two-player game S, S 0 , Σ c , Σ u , → equipped with an observation set (Obs, γ) of its state space defines a game of imperfect information S, S 0 , Σ c , Σ u , →, Obs, γ . The size of the game is the sum of the sizes of the transition relation → and the set Obs.
Obs, γ be a game of imperfect information. We say that G is a game of incomplete information if for any obs 1 , obs 2 ∈ Obs, if obs 1 = obs 2 then γ(obs 1 ) ∩ γ(obs 2 ) = ∅, that is the observations are disjoint, thus partitioning the state space. We say that G is a game of perfect information if Obs = S and γ is the identity function.
The drawback of games of incomplete information is that they are not suited for a robust modelization of sensors. Indeed, real sensors are imprecise and may return different observations for a given state.
An observation based strategy for a game of imperfect information
Definition 9 [Winning strategy] We say that an observation based strategy λ for a game G of imperfect information is winning if for every (x, obs) ∈ Outcome λ (G), we have last(x) ∈ Enabled(λ(obs)).
Let us call an history a couple (obs k , σ k−1 ) ∈ Obs + × Σ c+ such that ∃x ∈ S + : x 0 ∈ S 0 and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k we have x i ∈ γ(obs i )) and for all ≤ i < k we have
Let us call knowledge after an history (obs k , σ k−1 ) the function K :
S defined inductively as follows.
Thus, the knowledge after an history (obs k , σ k−1 ) is the set of states the player can be sure the game is in after this history.
The imperfect information control problem for a class C of games of imperfect information is defined as follows: given a game G ∈ C, determine whether there exists a winning observation based strategy for G. We define similarly the incomplete information control problem and the perfect information control problem.
Safety games We can encode the classical safety games using our winning condition. To show that, we first need some definitions. Given a game of imperfect information G we say that a set of state
We say that a strategy λ is safe on a game of imperfect information G w.r.t. a final set of bad states S b ⊆ S if for every (x, obs) ∈ Outcome λ (G) we have last(x) / ∈ S b . The imperfect information safety control problem for a class C of games of imperfect information is defined as follows: given a two-player game G ∈ C and a final set of states S b of G, determine whether there exists an observation based strategy λ which is safe w.r.t S b .
Theorem 10
The imperfect information safety control problem can be reduced to the imperfect information control problem.
Using the Lattice of Antichains
We show how the lattice of antichains that we have introduced in Section 2 can be used to solve games of imperfect information by iterating a predecessor operator.
Controllable predecessors For q ∈ L, define the set of controllable predecessors of q as follows:
Let us consider an antichain q = {s 0 , s 1 , . . . }. A set s belongs to CPre(q) iff (i) there is a controllable action σ that is enabled in each state of s, (ii) when the controller plays σ, any observation compatible with the next state reached by the game (after the environment has played) suffices to determine in which set s i of q that next state lies 1 , and (iii) s is maximal .
Lemma 11
The operator CPre : L → L is monotone for the partial ordering .
Remark The controllable predecessor operator is also monotone w.r.t. the set of observations in the following sense: given a two-player game G, let CPre 1 (resp. CPre 2 ) be the operator defined on the set of observations (Obs 1 , γ 1 ) (resp. (Obs 2 , γ 2 )). If {γ 2 (obs) | obs ∈ Obs 2 } {γ 1 (obs) | obs ∈ Obs 1 }, then for any q ∈ L we have CPre 1 (q)
CPre 2 (q). That corresponds to the informal statement that it is easier to control a system with more precise observations.
game of imperfect information. There exists an observation based strategy winning on G if and only if
Before proving this theorem, we give some intuition. We denote by Win the set {q | q = CPre(q)} which is the greatest fixed point of CPre. Condition (1) states that any observation of the initial state x 0 suffices to determine in which set s of Win the game has been started. Since Win is a fixed point of the controllable predecessor operator, we know that in each set s of Win we have a controllable action that can be played by the controller in every state x ∈ s such that (i) the state z reached after the move of the environment lies in one of the sets s of Win whatever the environment does and, such that (ii) the set s can be determined using any observation compatible with z. Following this, there exists a winning strategy if Condition (1) holds. The other direction of the theorem is a direct consequence of Tarski's Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 12.
First, we give an effective construction of a winning strategy for G, in the form of a finite automaton. For q ∈ L and σ ∈ Σ c , let φ(q, σ) = {s ∈ S | s ⊆ Enabled(σ) and ∀obs ∈ Obs, ∃s ∈ q : Post Σ u (Post σ (s)) ∩ γ(obs) ⊆ s } be the set of controllable predecessors of q for the action σ. From the greatest fixed point Win of CPre, we define the finite state automaton A = Q, q 0 , L, δ where
The quantification over obs is universal since for observations that are incompatible with the new state, the condition holds trivially.
-q 0 is the initial state, -L : Q\{q 0 } → Σ c is a labeling of the states. For each s ∈ Win, we choose σ ∈ Σ c such that s ∈ φ(Win, σ) and we fix L(s) = σ (such a σ exists since Win is a fixed point of CPre). -δ : Q × Obs → Q is a transition function.
• For each obs ∈ Obs, choose s ∈ Win such that S 0 ∩ γ(obs)
Letδ : Q×Obs + → Q be an extension of the transition function δ on words defined recursively byδ(s, obs) = δ(s, obs) andδ(s, obs.obs) = δ(δ(s, obs), obs).
The strategy defined by A is λ :
If for some obs there is no s such thatδ(q 0 , obs) = s, then the sequence of observations obs is impossible. In this case, we can set λ(obs) to any value. Now we proceed with the proof of the theorem.
-If (1) holds. We show that the strategy λ defined by A is such that for any (x, obs) ∈ Outcome λ (G), we have (i) last(x) ∈δ(q 0 , obs) and (ii) last(x) ∈ Enabled(λ(obs)) (thus λ is winning) . We show this by induction on the length of x and obs. 1. |x| = 1. We have x = x 0 and obs = obs 0 with x 0 ∈ S 0 and x 0 ∈ γ(obs 0 ). Let s =δ(q 0 , obs 0 ) and σ = L(s) = λ(obs 0 ). By construction of A, we have S 0 ∩ γ(obs 0 ) ⊆ s and s ∈ Win. As x 0 ∈ s and Win is a fixed point of CPre, we have (i) last(x) ∈δ(q 0 , obs 0 ) and (ii) x 0 ∈ Enabled(λ(obs 0 )). 2. |x| > 0. We have x = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k and obs = obs 0 , obs 1 , . . . , obs k with x k ∈ γ(obs k ). Let s k−1 =δ(q 0 , obs k−1 ) and σ = L(s k−1 ) = λ(obs k−1 ). By the induction hypothesis, we have x k−1 ∈ s k−1 . For obs = obs k , let s k = δ(s k−1 , obs). By construction of A, we have s k ∈ Win and Post Σ u (Post σ (s k−1 ))∩ γ(obs) ⊆ s k . Therefore, we have x k ∈ s k and by definition of L, we have s k ⊆ Enabled(σ ) where σ = L(s k ) = λ(obs k ). This yields (i) last(x) ∈ δ(q 0 , obs) and (ii) x k ∈ Enabled(λ(obs k )). -If λ is an observation based strategy that is winning on G. We must show that (1) holds. Let V λ ⊆ 2 S × Obs + be the smallest set (w.r.t. to ⊆) such that: • (S 0 ∩ γ(obs), obs) ∈ V λ for every obs ∈ Obs, and • if (s, obs) ∈ V λ then (Post Σ u (Post λ(obs) (s)) ∩ γ(obs), obs.obs) ∈ V λ for every obs ∈ Obs. Let W λ = {s | (s, obs) ∈ V λ }. Let us show that W λ CPre(W λ ). By Lemma 1, it suffices to show that W λ ⊆ CPre(W λ ) . Let (s, obs) ∈ V λ with obs = obs 0 , obs 1 , . . . , obs k and let us show that s ∈ CPre(W λ ). By definition of V λ , there exist s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k such that s 0 = S 0 ∩ γ(obs 0 ), s k = s, and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k: s i = Post Σ u (Post σi (s i−1 )) ∩ γ(obs i ) with σ i = λ(obs 0 obs 1 . . . obs i−1 ). For any sequence of states x = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k with x i ∈ s i and (x k , obs k ) ∈ Outcome λ (G), since λ is winning on G, we have x k ∈ Enabled(λ(obs)) and thus s ⊆ Enabled(λ(obs)). Also we have Post Σ u (Post λ(obs) (s))∩ γ(obs) ∈ W λ for every obs ∈ Obs by construction of V λ . This entails that s ∈ CPre(W λ ) , showing that W λ CPre(W λ ), that is CPre is extensive at W λ and by the Tarski's fixed point Theorem W λ Win. The conclusion follows since {S 0 ∩ γ(obs) | obs ∈ Obs} ⊆ W λ .
Games with Finite State Space
In this section we show that computing the greatest fixed point of CPre for finite state games can be done in EXPTIME. We also compare our algorithm based on the lattice of antichains with the classical technique of [Rei84] .
Fixed Point Algorithm
To compute the greatest fixed point of CPre, we iterate CPre from S using Algorithm 1. This algorithm constructs systematically subsets of S and checks at line 6 whether they belong to CPre(q). This is done by treating all subsets of size i before the subsets of size i − 1, so we avoid to treat the subsets of the already included subsets and the result is in reduced form. Therefore, Algorithm 1 uses the following operator Children(s) = {s\{x} | x ∈ s} which returns the subsets of s of cardinality |s| − 1.
Lemma 13 Algorithm 1 computes CPre in EXPTIME in the size of the game.
Lemma 14 An ascending (or descending) chain in L, , , , ⊥ ,
has at most 2 n + 1 elements where n = |S|.
Theorem 15 The imperfect information control problem is EXPTIME-complete.
Proof. We first prove the upper bound. From Lemma 14 and since CPre is monotone, we reach the greatest fixed point Win after at most O(2 n ) iterations of CPre. From Lemma 13 computing CPre can be done in EXPTIME. The conclusion follows. For the lower bound, since we solve a more general problem than Reif [Rei84] , we have the EXPTIME-hardness.
Example
Consider the two-player game G 1 on Fig. 1 with state space S = {1, 1 , 2, 2 , 3, 3 , Bad}, initial state S 0 = {2, 3}, actions Σ c = {a, b} and Σ u = {u}. The observation set is Obs = {obs 1 , obs 2 } with γ(obs 1 ) = {1, 1 , 2, 2 , Bad} and γ(obs 2 ) = {1, 1 , 3, 3 }.
For the controller, the goal is to avoid state Bad in which there is no controllable action. So the controller must play an a in state 1 and 3 and a b in state 2. However the controller cannot distinguish 1 from 2 using only the current observation. Thus, to discriminate those states, the controller has to rely on its memory of the past observations.
We show below the iterations of the fixed point algorithm and the construction of the strategy. The fixed point computation starts from = {S}. Each set is paired with an action that can be played in all the states of that set:
Since S 4 = S 3 , we have Win = S 3 = {{1}, {2}, {3}}. The existence of a winning strategy is established by condition (1) of Theorem 12 since the sets S 0 ∩γ(obs 1 ) = {2} and S 0 ∩ γ(obs 2 ) = {3} are dominated in Win.
From the fixed point, using the construction given in the proof of Theorem 12, we construct the automaton of Fig. 2 which encodes a winning strategy. Indeed, when the game starts the control is either in state 2 if the given observation is obs 1 or in state 3 if the given observation is obs 2 . In the first case, the controller plays b and in the second case, it plays a. Then the game lies in state 1. According to the strategy automaton, the controller plays an a and receives a new observation that allows it to determine if the game lies now in state 2 (obs 1 ) or in state 3 (obs 2 ). From there, the controller can clearly iterate this strategy. 
Comparison with the classical technique of [Rei84]
In [Rei84] the author gives an algorithm to transform a game of incomplete information G into a game G of perfect information on the histories of G.
The idea can be expressed as follows : given a game of incomplete information G = S, S 0 , Σ c , Σ u , → 1 , Obs, γ define a two-player game G = S , S 0 , Σ c , {ε}, → 2 as follows: S is the set of knowledges K(obs k , σ k−1 ) such that (obs k , σ k−1 ) is an history of G. S 0 is the set of knowledges {K(obs 0 )|γ(obs 0 ) ∩ S 0 = ∅}. Finally the transition relation → 2 is defined as follows:
To obtain the final game of perfect information G , equip G with the set of observation (S , γ I ) where γ I is the identity function. Solving the resulting game of perfect information G requires linear time in the size of S but there exist games of incomplete information G requiring the construction of a game of perfect information of size exponentially larger than the size of G. As our algorithm does not require this determinization, it is easy to find families of games where our method is exponentially faster than Reif's algorithm. This is formalized in the next theorem.
Theorem 16
There exist finite state games of incomplete information for which the algorithm of [Rei84] requires an exponential time where our algorithm needs only polynomial time.
Control with imperfect information of rectangular automata
In this section, we introduce the notion of infinite games with finite stable quotient. We use this notion to show that the discrete control problem for games of imperfect information defined by rectangular automata is decidable. This result extends the results in [HK99] .
Games with Finite R-stable quotient
Here we drop the assumption that S is finite and we consider the case where there exists a finite quotient of S over which the game is stable. We obtain a general decidability result for games of imperfect information with finite stable quotients.
Let R = {r 1 , . . . , r l } be a finite partition of S. A set s ⊆ S is R-definable if s = r∈Z r for some Z ⊆ R. We say that an antichain q ∈ L is R-definable if for every s ∈ q, s is R-definable.
Definition 17 [R-stable] A game of imperfect information S, S 0 , Σ c , Σ u , →, Obs, γ is R-stable if for every σ ∈ Σ c the following conditions hold: (i) Enabled(σ) is Rdefinable; (ii) for every r ∈ R, Post Σ u (Post σ (r)) is R-definable; (iii) for any r, r ∈ R, if for some x ∈ r and u ∈ Σ u we have Post u (Post σ )({x})∩r = ∅ then for any x ∈ r, there exists u ∈ Σ u such that Post Σ u (Post σ )({x}) ∩ r = ∅; (iv) furthermore, for every obs ∈ Obs, γ(obs) is R-definable.
The next lemma states properties of R-stable games of imperfect information. They are useful for the proof of the next theorem.
Lemma 18 Let G = S, S 0 , Σ c , Σ u , →, Obs, γ be a R-stable game of imperfect information. Let s, s , s ⊆ S and r ∈ R such that (i) s and s are R-definable and
The greatest fixed point of CPre is a R-definable antichain and is computable.
Proof. We show that for any R-definable antichain q ∈ L, the antichain CPre(q) is also R-definable. Let s ∈ CPre(q). For any r ∈ R such that s ∩ r = ∅, we have by Lemma 18 that s ∪ r ∈ CPre(q). Since s ⊆ s ∪ r, we must have s = s ∪ r. This shows that s is R-definable. The number of R-definable antichains is finite, and so, using Tarski's theorem, we can compute the greatest fixed point of CPre in a finite number of iterations.
Rectangular automata
We first recall the definition of rectangular automata and we define their associated game semantics. We recall a result of [HK99] that establishes the existence of a finite bisimulation quotient for this game semantics.
Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of real-valued variables. A rectangular inequality over X is a formula of the form x i ∼ c, where c is an integer constant, and ∼ is one of the following: <, ≤, >, ≥. A rectangular predicate over X is a conjunction of rectangular inequalities. The set of all rectangular predicates over X is denoted Rect(X). The automaton H has nondecreasing (resp. bounded; nondecreasing or bounded) variables if all n variables of H are nondecreasing (resp. bounded; either nondecreasing or bounded).
In the sequel, all the rectangular automata that we consider are assumed to be with nondecreasing or bounded variables.
We now associate a game semantics to each rectangular automaton.
Definition 22 [Discrete game semantics of rectangular automata] The game semantics of a rectangular automaton H = Loc, Lab, Edg, X, Init, Inv, Flow, Jump is the game 
Control of Rectangular Automata with imperfect information
We are now in position to extend the result of [HK99] to the case of imperfect information.
Given H = Loc, Lab, Edg, X, Init, Inv, Flow, Jump , a m-bounded rectangular automaton, we say that the observation set (Obs, γ) is m-bounded if for each obs ∈ Obs, γ(obs) is definable as a finite union of sets of the form {(l, v) | v ∈ g} where g is m-bounded rectangle. As corollary of Theorem 19 and Theorem 26, we have that:
Theorem 26
Corollary 1. The discrete control problem for games of imperfect information defined by m bounded rectangular automata and m-bounded observation sets is decidable (in 2EXPTIME).
So far, we do not have a hardness result but we conjecture that the problem is 2EXPTIME-complete. Now, let us illustrate the discrete control problem for games of imperfect information defined by rectangular automata on an example. Example We have implemented our fixed point algorithm using HYTECH and its script language [HHWT95] . We illustrate the use of the algorithm on a simple example. Fig. 3 shows a rectangular automaton with four locations and one continuous variable x.
In this example, the game models a cooling system that controls the temperature x. When requested to start, the system begins to cool down. There are two modes of cooling, either fast or slow, among which the environment chooses. The controller can only observe the system through two observations: H with γ(H) = {( , x) | x ≥ 280} and L with γ(L) = {( , x) | x ≤ 285}. Thus, only the continuous variable x can be observed imperfectly, not the modes. Depending on the mode however, the timing and action to stop the system are different. In the slow mode, the controller has to issue an action a when the temperature is below 280. In the fast mode, the controller has to issue an action b when the temperature is below 270.
The controller must use its memory of the past observations to make the correct action in time. If the first two observations are H, H then the controller knows that the mode is Slow. If the first two observations are H, L then the controller knows that the mode is Fast.
The greatest fixed point, given below, allows the computation of the deterministic strategy depicted in Fig. 4 . The whole process has been automated in HYTECH. The correspondence between state numbers in the figure and states of the fixed point is the following: As before, the strategy associates an action to each set of the fixed point and the observations give the next state of the strategy.
